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&gt;&gt; Hello, thanks for joining our webcast
today, Reviving European Securitization.

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My name is Peter Gibson, and I'm responsible
for consultant relations at PGIM across EMEA.

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I'm joined by Kaustub Samant, who leads
our Securitized Credit Research Team,

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and Taggart Davis, head of
Government Affairs for EMEA.

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The securitization market is a vital tool that
enables capital markets to function efficiently

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and also provides businesses
with a diverse source of funding.

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Since the global financial
crisis, the U.S. has built a robust

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and mature market, whereas
the Europe has lagged.

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It has lagged because it's
hindered by regulatory barriers

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to entry, and fragmented market practices.

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To unlock its potential, Europe needs targeted
reforms to enhance investor confidence

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and pave the way for more dynamic
and competitive financial markets.

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Today we're going to look at how
securitization has a role to play in this.

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So, Kaustub, is it okay if
I start with you, please?

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Perhaps you could take a look at how
the securitization markets have evolved

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and indeed diverged since the
global financial crisis in 2008.

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&gt;&gt; Yeah, thanks Peter, and thanks
for -- thanks for having me.

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So, I think it's worth putting
the market in perspective.

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Obviously the market was at the center
of the financial crisis in 2008,

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and a few things have happened since then.

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A lot of these have been regulatory
changes that have been global.

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So, things like [inaudible], where issuers
have to retain a certain amount of credit risk

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when they do a securitization,
that's been a global change.

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And some of these have been changes that
have happened for individual markets, right?

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So obviously the mortgage market in the U.S.
was, and that was at the heart of the crisis.

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And so there have been changes made to improve
underwriting, improve the credit risk profile

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of the mortgages [inaudible] in the U.S. And at
the same time, you've had structural changes,

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so there have been changes made in
terms of the structural offerings

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and how these things are packaged
into securitizations, right?

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So there's been sort of this new foundation that
has been built for that securitization market,

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and if you think about what's
happened on top of that, post-GFC,

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if you turn to the next slide what you'll
see is issuance has really moved up.

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So, the U.S., in the U.S. market, if you look
at issuance in 2021, it hit almost $750 billion.

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That's the same level of issuance
that we had pre-GFC in 2007.

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So at least from an issuance perspective,
we're back to where we were pre,

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pre kind of financial crisis around that time.

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Obviously since then rates have gone up
a little bit, so volumes have come down,

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but that's a very healthy place
for the market to be on top

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of what I said were new foundational
changes to the market.

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And then once you dig deeper into kind of what's
being financed to the securitization market,

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it's a much broader range of
assets than has been financed kind

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of in the years after the GFC, right?

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So post-GFC we just had sort
of your traditional mortgages,

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your credit cards, your autos,
your student loans.

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You had, you had you know, leveraged loans
and you had kind of real estate, right?

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Over the next, last few years rather, there
has been new forms of lending that's happened.

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So just look at the consumer space.

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In the U.S. you're no longer just borrowing
through credit cards, you can now borrow

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through the buy now, pay later market, you can
now borrow through the home improvement market.

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If you want to put up solar
panels on your house,

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you can borrow for that specifically, right?

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So there's new forms of lending that's
happening, and that is all getting financed

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through the securitization market.

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So, the market is providing
access to a much broader range

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of assets than, kind of in years past.

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And at the same time, from
an investing standpoint,

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all major investor groups
are very well represented

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in the U.S. securitization market, right?

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So insurance companies are
active, money managers active,

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hedge funds are active, banks are active.

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In different parts of the capital structure,

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in different [inaudible] profiles,
in different asset classes.

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But it's still a very vibrant market with a lot
of players and a lot of buyers, which is really,

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really good to see, because that's obviously
the very sustainable place for the market to be.

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Compare that to Europe.

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Right? So in Europe issuance
has obviously also come back

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since the years after the financial crisis.

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But on a relative basis, the market has lagged.

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So in 2024, what this chart shows is

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that the European public securitization issuance
amounts to about 14% of the U.S. market.

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And pre-GFC that number was
a third of the U.S. market.

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Right, so on a relative basis, European issuance
has actually come down relative to the U.S.

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And so, what has that resulted in?

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So if you turn to the next slide, what
that's done to the European economy is more

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of the financing is reliant on banks.

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And direct bank lending, right?

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So nearly, what this chart
shows, more than 50% of lending

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in some form or the other, is bank driven.

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And I think that is, on one hand
you can argue that it's positive

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because banks are [inaudible]
entities, but I think what's happening

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because of this is obviously the stuff that's
getting financed is something banks want

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to lend towards.

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So it may not be some of the newer asset
classes, some of the more cutting edge types

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of lending, types of products
that are really needed to sort

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of drive the European economy, right?

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So, I think securitization has a part to play
to help that process, but obviously if it's --

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if it's curtailed because of regulation,

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then it's harder for that
market to help in that process.

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So I'll turn back to you, Peter.

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&gt;&gt; Super. Thank you Kaustub.

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So what do you think's holding back the
European securitization market from developing

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and evolving as much as the U.S.?

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&gt;&gt; Yeah, maybe I'll take the
question a little bit differently.

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Before we actually go into
what's, what's -- what the --

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what is kind of holding the market back, let's
maybe talk about some of the benefits of kind

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of opening up the European
securitization market, right?

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Like what is, what is the benefits of that?

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So, if you think about securitization it really
-- it really funds the real economy, right?

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Securitization is ultimately what is it funding?

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It's directing financing mortgages,
so it's directly financing homeowners,

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directly financing kind of
credit card loans, auto loans,

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directly financing consumption in the economy.

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You can argue it's financing real estate
to the commercial real estate market,

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it's providing for access to credit to kind
of small and medium enterprises, right?

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So it's funding hard assets and
it's funding the real economy.

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And then for investors what's happening is
it's, is it's providing kind of higher spread

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and so better relative value, we would argue.

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If you look at kind of same duration, same
credit profile, securitized assets trade wider

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than kind of comparable assets
maybe in the corporate market.

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So that's having a huge positive.

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And then when you dig into it,

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but what's driving your credit
profile if you buy securitization.

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It really isn't, it really isn't
single name risk to specific issuer.

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So for example, if you buy an auto loan
ABS, you're maybe a little bit less --

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your credit risk is less correlated
to how that auto manufacturer's going

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to perform from a credit perspective.

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And it's really your credit profile's going
to be driven by how each consumer is choosing

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or not choosing to pay back
their auto loan, right?

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So from a credit profile you get access,
you can tap different parts of the market

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that are actually very, very
difficult to access.

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I think for policy makers the benefits is

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that it provides transparency
into the economy, right?

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So it basically tells [inaudible] policy
makers, okay, how are borrowers performing?

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How's consumers performing when it comes

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to paying back their car loans,
paying back their auto loans?

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How are small and medium
enterprises doing, right?

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So loans that would otherwise be just stuck
on bank balance sheets or in sort of held

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to majority [inaudible] elsewhere,
are now being publicly,

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that performance is now being
publicly disseminated.

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So I think policy makers have a real-time view

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into how these key parts in
the economy are functioning.

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Which I think has a tremendous
amount of benefit.

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And so, I think maybe just to --
just to hand it over to you, Taggart,

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how do you think these benefits tie into
kind of Europe's broader economic goals?

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&gt;&gt; Well thank you, Kaustub, and thanks
to you and Peter for having me today.

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Well I really agree with
your synopsis there Kaustub,

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but maybe just putting our political hats on
for a minute, I think it's worth mentioning

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that securitization can also really
help the EU realize its political goals,

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especially around competitiveness.

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We had the Draghi Report last year, where
Mario Draghi set out the need for the EU

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to enhance its competitiveness,
especially in the areas

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of innovation, defense, and renewables.

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And securitization can really help
with all three of those goals.

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Ultimately, the EU economy benefits through
opening channels of capital to finance growth,

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whether it's for its technology
ambitions, its infrastructure ambitions,

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its defense or renewable ambitions.

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Maybe just to give one nice example
in the decarbonization space,

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last year we saw the first heat pump asset
backed finance initiative in Germany,

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that really helped to make installation of
heat pumps more affordable for homeowners.

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So this helps the EU deliver on
its decarbonization goals as well

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as reduce its energy dependencies.

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&gt;&gt; So Kaustub, coming back to you then,
what reforms do you believe are needed

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to revive the European securitization market?

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&gt;&gt; Yeah, so I think this has
been a key sort of focus of ours.

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And if you go to the next slide, let's maybe
talk about some other reforms that are needed.

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So there's been a lot of talk about bank capital
and changes to the banking regulatory framework

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and how that can improve
access to securitization

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and improve the securitization market.

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I'm not going to -- I'm not going to
go through that here because I think

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that conversation has been --
has been had pretty, pretty well.

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Let's maybe focus more on the insurance side.

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So the insurance buyer base in the
U.S., especially in recent years,

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has been very active, especially in kind of the
mortgage market and the ABS market and so on.

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And we just don't see that same
level of activity in Europe.

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And so I think it's really important
that insurance companies be more active

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in the European market simply because
they have, they have preferences

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for certain duration profiles
and credit risks, that --

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that can be well-served by securitization.

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But I think what's holding it back
simply is just capital, right?

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Because ultimately what banks
and insurance companies try

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and maximize is this return on capital.

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So, just these capital rules I think

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for insurance companies have
to be better calibrated.

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So what we see in this chart here is,
and I just focused on the CQS1 step,

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and look at the capital regulations
there, right?

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So on CQS1, there is -- there is capital that is
differentiated between sort of STS and non-STS.

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STS just stands for certain securitizations
that meet the Simple Transparent

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and Standardized framework in Europe.

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And fortunately that's not
a big part of the market.

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But as you can see, there are lower
capital requirements for STS seniors,

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than for STS non-seniors, which makes sense

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because STS seniors are more
[inaudible] than non-seniors.

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But when you go to the non-STS market, which
as I said is the bigger chunk of the market,

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there is no such differentiation.

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We are basically at 100% capital,
regardless of whether you buy a super safe,

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super short duration bond, or
whether you buy the equity bonds.

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So naturally if you're an insurance company,
you're probably not going to buy a lot

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of non-STS products simply because the capital
doesn't work and the return doesn't work.

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And so these the are types of things that need
to be addressed, and capital regulations have

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to be better risk calibrated to address the
kind of the needs of the insurance community.

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Because that's kind of an important
buyer base, that's there in the U.S.

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and that's maybe less active in Europe.

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And I think Taggart is going to talk about sort
of broader reforms in terms of due diligence

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and transparency and so on, but before we
go there, if you just go to the next slide,

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what I want to touch on is maybe sort of a
framework maybe that's needed when we think

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about this sort of investor community, right?

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So, if you think about European investors in the
securitization market, right, because of a bunch

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of regulations that are put around this, they
currently have access to about 1.1 trillion

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of available assets globally, right?

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So, I would argue that that's
a pretty big market,

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I think most would say that's a
pretty large market, which is great.

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But, there's another 2.5 trillion that's
sitting out there that is not compliant

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with European regulations and so cannot be,

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cannot be accessed by the
European investor base.

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Right? And that's a shame, and I think
what it does is by limiting market access

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to this entire market, naturally in some way
will reduce interest in this market, right?

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For Europe to have an active
securitization market you need active issuers

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but you also need active investors.

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And an investor base that can only invest in
a small chunk, or maybe a subset I should say,

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of the broader market is naturally not
going to be as interested in securitization

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versus let's say corporates, or equities,
or some other broader asset class.

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So we need asset allocators, people that think
about whether I need to be in corporates,

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or whether I should be in securitized products,
or whether I should buy government bonds.

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These people, they need to think and
those are ultimately our clients,

00:13:51.726 --> 00:13:56.516 align:middle
our clients need to have access to I think
entire securitization market globally,

00:13:57.116 --> 00:13:58.836 align:middle
just to make this market more appealing.

00:13:58.836 --> 00:14:00.806 align:middle
And I would argue that's
ultimately going to help Europe.

00:14:01.016 --> 00:14:04.856 align:middle
Because if you have a domestic investor
base that is very active globally,

00:14:05.256 --> 00:14:09.846 align:middle
you're going to then bring out issuers that
want to tap into that investor base, right?

00:14:09.996 --> 00:14:15.536 align:middle
And so, that's just something that we hope
isn't lost to regulators as they think

00:14:15.536 --> 00:14:19.586 align:middle
about what regulatory forms are
need in Europe for securitization.

00:14:19.736 --> 00:14:23.696 align:middle
So with that, I guess that broad overview,
I want to turn it to Taggart, and Taggart,

00:14:23.696 --> 00:14:26.966 align:middle
maybe you can talk about some of the
specific changes that we've advocated

00:14:27.036 --> 00:14:29.996 align:middle
for within securitization
for issuers and investors.

00:14:32.676 --> 00:14:34.216 align:middle
&gt;&gt; Well sure, thank you Kaustub.

00:14:34.216 --> 00:14:38.126 align:middle
I think there are a few other
areas where the EU has kind of come

00:14:38.126 --> 00:14:43.066 align:middle
down with a very heavy regulatory footprint,
and I'll mention a couple of those.

00:14:43.066 --> 00:14:50.236 align:middle
One is due diligence, in Europe, securitization
is singled out as a special asset class

00:14:50.236 --> 00:14:52.836 align:middle
that needs extra investor due diligence.

00:14:53.076 --> 00:14:57.216 align:middle
And this really kind of makes Europe
an outlier but not in a good way.

00:14:57.696 --> 00:15:03.046 align:middle
So we have sectoral legislation in Europe,
like UCITS that governs mutual funds,

00:15:03.046 --> 00:15:06.936 align:middle
AIFMD that governs all --
governs alternative funds, IORP,

00:15:07.426 --> 00:15:09.756 align:middle
which deals with workplace pensions,

00:15:09.926 --> 00:15:15.046 align:middle
and all of these regulatory frameworks have
pretty detailed risk management frameworks

00:15:15.046 --> 00:15:19.506 align:middle
and due diligence frameworks that
ensure investors carry out due diligence

00:15:19.506 --> 00:15:21.926 align:middle
on all the investments in their portfolio.

00:15:22.396 --> 00:15:30.856 align:middle
And so, it's duplicative and onerous to have
this extra layer of due diligence that focuses

00:15:30.856 --> 00:15:33.206 align:middle
on securitization investment only.

00:15:33.576 --> 00:15:36.976 align:middle
Especially given the strong
track record of the asset class.

00:15:37.956 --> 00:15:43.106 align:middle
When we think about due diligence at PGIM,
whether we're carrying out due diligence

00:15:43.106 --> 00:15:48.866 align:middle
for a U.S. investor or a European
investor, really it's identical for us.

00:15:48.866 --> 00:15:55.366 align:middle
We do really detailed and robust risk
assessments in each instance and we won't invest

00:15:55.446 --> 00:15:58.616 align:middle
in an asset if we can't properly
assess the risk profile.

00:15:58.616 --> 00:16:03.816 align:middle
But what's different in Europe is when we're
investing here, there's a lot of documentation

00:16:03.816 --> 00:16:08.706 align:middle
and paperwork that's involved,
given the regulation demands it.

00:16:09.106 --> 00:16:15.296 align:middle
And we are, at PGIM we're a larger asset
manager, so we can handle the compliance costs,

00:16:15.396 --> 00:16:19.966 align:middle
and we can do all this pretty quickly,
but for a smaller asset manager,

00:16:19.966 --> 00:16:25.326 align:middle
this can really be a barrier to entry because
of the high cost and the time involved.

00:16:25.606 --> 00:16:29.516 align:middle
And when you take this market
wide, we're concerned that all

00:16:29.516 --> 00:16:33.916 align:middle
of this daunting documentation can really
dampen demand in the overall market.

00:16:34.126 --> 00:16:39.746 align:middle
So, what we've suggested is really significantly
streamlining investor due diligence

00:16:39.746 --> 00:16:41.066 align:middle
for securitization.

00:16:41.996 --> 00:16:45.896 align:middle
We suggest to policy makers that
they take the sectoral legislation,

00:16:45.896 --> 00:16:52.756 align:middle
UCITS or AFIMD for example, and look at the due
diligence there and then think very carefully

00:16:52.756 --> 00:16:59.306 align:middle
about any extra due diligence that you put on
top of that, given the extra cost involved.

00:16:59.306 --> 00:17:03.196 align:middle
We really encourage policy makers
to take a principles-based approach

00:17:03.536 --> 00:17:07.926 align:middle
to the extra due diligence that they have
to do when investing in securitization.

00:17:08.626 --> 00:17:12.146 align:middle
A second issue that I wanted
to raise was reporting.

00:17:12.876 --> 00:17:18.296 align:middle
The reporting that issuers in Europe
have to comply with is much more detailed

00:17:18.296 --> 00:17:20.846 align:middle
than what issuers face in
other parts of the world.

00:17:21.146 --> 00:17:27.956 align:middle
There are literally hundreds of data fields
that issuers must report that add a lot of cost

00:17:27.956 --> 00:17:32.796 align:middle
to issuing in Europe, as well as being
a large investor in securitization,

00:17:32.796 --> 00:17:36.466 align:middle
PGIM is also a top issuer of
collateralized loan obligations,

00:17:36.956 --> 00:17:45.356 align:middle
and we estimate that the cost associated with
EU reporting on our CLOs is between 10,000 euros

00:17:45.356 --> 00:17:48.976 align:middle
and 31,000 euros per CLO per year.

00:17:49.536 --> 00:17:54.106 align:middle
And that's just additional cost that just
doesn't exist in other parts of the world,

00:17:54.446 --> 00:17:58.996 align:middle
making European products more
expensive and potentially muting supply

00:17:58.996 --> 00:18:04.936 align:middle
as some issuers just might be turned
off by those, those additional costs.

00:18:05.676 --> 00:18:10.836 align:middle
When we think about this, our -- the investors
in our CLOs really value the transparency

00:18:10.836 --> 00:18:12.996 align:middle
that they get from trustee reports,

00:18:13.086 --> 00:18:17.866 align:middle
and they don't request the additional
detail in the ESMA templates.

00:18:17.866 --> 00:18:21.416 align:middle
We've actually password protected
some of that ESMA reporting

00:18:21.676 --> 00:18:25.316 align:middle
and we haven't had investors
even ask us for the password,

00:18:25.656 --> 00:18:29.016 align:middle
so that suggests that they don't
really need all that information.

00:18:29.266 --> 00:18:32.616 align:middle
Now perhaps supervisors want
some additional information,

00:18:32.866 --> 00:18:37.266 align:middle
but we think they should take what
investors use as a starting point

00:18:37.266 --> 00:18:41.166 align:middle
and then think really carefully about
what additional information they need,

00:18:41.166 --> 00:18:47.136 align:middle
knowing that those additional
data fields come with extra cost.

00:18:47.136 --> 00:18:52.066 align:middle
So we, again, we think this is an area where
some simplification of the regulation is needed.

00:18:52.126 --> 00:18:55.936 align:middle
A last issue that I wanted
to raise was around UCITS.

00:18:56.116 --> 00:19:02.676 align:middle
We think that securitization could comprise a
greater part of the portfolios of UCITS funds

00:19:03.016 --> 00:19:10.086 align:middle
but investors are held back both by
regulatory pressures and supervisory pressures.

00:19:10.336 --> 00:19:16.586 align:middle
So on the regulatory side, the UCITS directive
limits funds from holding more than 10%

00:19:16.946 --> 00:19:19.406 align:middle
of issuance of a single bond issuer.

00:19:19.676 --> 00:19:24.936 align:middle
And that might make sense in the context of
a corporate issuer or a sovereign issuer,

00:19:24.936 --> 00:19:28.356 align:middle
where you wouldn't want one
investment fund to have a sort

00:19:28.356 --> 00:19:31.506 align:middle
of undue influence in that single entity.

00:19:31.506 --> 00:19:36.726 align:middle
However, in the case of securitization,
which is a diversified pool of assets,

00:19:36.996 --> 00:19:38.926 align:middle
we just feel this rule doesn't make sense.

00:19:39.246 --> 00:19:45.346 align:middle
So we've advocated that policy makers just think

00:19:45.346 --> 00:19:51.186 align:middle
about exempting securitization
pools from that single issuer limit.

00:19:51.366 --> 00:19:57.656 align:middle
The other issue that I wanted to talk about
in the UCITS context was supervisory pressure.

00:19:57.656 --> 00:20:02.896 align:middle
So we've just noticed that some national
[inaudible] authorities looked a bit dubiously

00:20:02.896 --> 00:20:07.966 align:middle
at securitization and place pretty strict
limits on investments in the asset class.

00:20:08.046 --> 00:20:15.436 align:middle
And we just feel that the data and evidence
doesn't really justify that skeptical approach.

00:20:15.706 --> 00:20:22.626 align:middle
So we just hope that the current review of the
regulation also maybe focuses regulators' minds

00:20:22.626 --> 00:20:29.186 align:middle
and encourages a bit more open-mindedness to
the asset class based on the evidence of the --

00:20:29.556 --> 00:20:31.846 align:middle
of the, and their proven track record.

00:20:32.766 --> 00:20:37.076 align:middle
Just one sort of final point that I
think kind of brings this all together,

00:20:37.276 --> 00:20:42.196 align:middle
it's not just about what policy makers
do, it's also about how they do it.

00:20:42.196 --> 00:20:46.446 align:middle
If they really want this effort to succeed
where past efforts have fallen short,

00:20:46.756 --> 00:20:50.726 align:middle
they need to approach these reforms
with really the right mindset.

00:20:50.916 --> 00:20:58.356 align:middle
To be honest, we just, we need to look at this
comprehensively, but we also need to really look

00:20:58.356 --> 00:21:01.986 align:middle
at it boldly and ambitiously
as we reform this market.

00:21:02.606 --> 00:21:07.656 align:middle
This is the third time that EU policy makers
have really had a crack at this agenda,

00:21:08.006 --> 00:21:11.926 align:middle
and if we don't get it right this time,
there might not be a fourth shot at it.

00:21:11.926 --> 00:21:15.476 align:middle
So, we see this as kind of a now or never moment

00:21:15.566 --> 00:21:19.126 align:middle
to set the securitization
agenda on a more positive path.

00:21:19.486 --> 00:21:23.576 align:middle
All that said, I'm feeling quite positive
that we can get it right this time,

00:21:23.576 --> 00:21:27.506 align:middle
given the strong political
momentum to improve this market.

00:21:27.626 --> 00:21:29.046 align:middle
&gt;&gt; Thank you, Taggart.

00:21:29.126 --> 00:21:33.666 align:middle
So you've alluded to working with the
financial regulators across Europe.

00:21:33.746 --> 00:21:38.896 align:middle
Could you give any indication on where
we are in that legislative process?

00:21:38.896 --> 00:21:43.836 align:middle
And also, any indication of potential reforms
that you think might start coming through?

00:21:44.296 --> 00:21:46.666 align:middle
&gt;&gt; Yeah, thanks so much, Peter.

00:21:46.666 --> 00:21:49.886 align:middle
But before we even get into that,
first I might talk a little bit

00:21:49.886 --> 00:21:52.806 align:middle
about why we're so engaged in this debate.

00:21:52.806 --> 00:21:57.486 align:middle
Firstly, it's because well, we're just
one of the largest investors globally

00:21:57.486 --> 00:22:00.866 align:middle
in securitized assets, so of
course we take an interest in it.

00:22:00.996 --> 00:22:05.536 align:middle
But secondly, it's because we're very
invested in and committed to Europe.

00:22:05.536 --> 00:22:11.046 align:middle
We have 750 professionals working
across 11 European jurisdictions,

00:22:11.046 --> 00:22:13.846 align:middle
so we take interest in the European market.

00:22:13.846 --> 00:22:20.046 align:middle
And lastly, kind of related to that, and I hope
this doesn't sound trite, because it's very true

00:22:20.416 --> 00:22:25.056 align:middle
that we take a long-term and holistic
view on the markets in which we operate.

00:22:25.106 --> 00:22:29.666 align:middle
So we don't just look at our own
performance, but we really also think a lot

00:22:29.666 --> 00:22:35.506 align:middle
about the broader ecosystem and the health of
the broader ecosystem in which we're operating.

00:22:36.726 --> 00:22:39.226 align:middle
So where are we, getting back to your question.

00:22:39.226 --> 00:22:44.956 align:middle
The European Commission consulted late last
year and we expect the European Commission

00:22:44.956 --> 00:22:48.576 align:middle
to propose legislation on the 17th of June.

00:22:48.576 --> 00:22:50.956 align:middle
So it's coming up very shortly.

00:22:51.366 --> 00:22:57.146 align:middle
But that June publication is only
the start of a political process.

00:22:57.206 --> 00:23:00.226 align:middle
And that's the political
process of the EU codecision.

00:23:01.026 --> 00:23:05.786 align:middle
Essentially the European Parliament and
the EU member states and the counsel have

00:23:05.786 --> 00:23:09.856 align:middle
to take the European Commission's
proposals, debate and amend them

00:23:09.856 --> 00:23:14.276 align:middle
in their respective institutions and
then finally, they have to come together

00:23:14.466 --> 00:23:18.746 align:middle
and reach a final compromise
between those respective positions.

00:23:19.736 --> 00:23:25.796 align:middle
There's political momentum to move quickly on
this agenda, but we also can't ignore the fact

00:23:25.796 --> 00:23:28.816 align:middle
that there's political stigma
around securitization,

00:23:28.816 --> 00:23:31.136 align:middle
especially in the European Parliament.

00:23:31.136 --> 00:23:34.826 align:middle
One senior EU policy maker
said to me very recently

00:23:34.826 --> 00:23:37.866 align:middle
that we're still haunted
by the ghosts of the past.

00:23:38.426 --> 00:23:41.506 align:middle
And she was alluding to the
global financial crisis.

00:23:42.406 --> 00:23:45.586 align:middle
So, what does that mean as
far as timing is concerned?

00:23:45.906 --> 00:23:51.646 align:middle
It means it might be ambitious to expect
a political agreement before late 2026,

00:23:51.646 --> 00:23:55.246 align:middle
or early 2027, and those
rules wouldn't actually come

00:23:55.246 --> 00:24:00.836 align:middle
into force probably before
late 2027 or early 2028.

00:24:00.836 --> 00:24:06.936 align:middle
An MEP said to me just last week that he would
prefer to take the time to get this right,

00:24:07.066 --> 00:24:09.156 align:middle
rather than rush through proposals.

00:24:10.456 --> 00:24:15.916 align:middle
We've put a tentative time table together,
which is this slide that you're looking at now,

00:24:16.196 --> 00:24:20.846 align:middle
but I would remind folks that
this is a political process

00:24:20.846 --> 00:24:24.066 align:middle
and so you really can't predict
these things with too much accuracy.

00:24:24.906 --> 00:24:25.486 align:middle
&gt;&gt; Thank you.

00:24:26.236 --> 00:24:30.836 align:middle
And just one final thing to say before
we wrap up, can you give some examples

00:24:30.836 --> 00:24:36.106 align:middle
of how you're actually engaging
in this review process?

00:24:37.216 --> 00:24:38.446 align:middle
&gt;&gt; Sure, absolutely Peter.

00:24:38.446 --> 00:24:44.786 align:middle
And we do have a final slide which is
really, this is kind of a non-exhaustive list

00:24:44.786 --> 00:24:47.336 align:middle
of the many government and regulatory bodies

00:24:47.336 --> 00:24:50.106 align:middle
that we've been engaging
with already on this topic.

00:24:50.106 --> 00:24:55.416 align:middle
So, despite this being non-exhaustive,
it looks a little bit exhausting,

00:24:55.416 --> 00:24:57.016 align:middle
because there's quite a few on there.

00:24:57.276 --> 00:25:02.226 align:middle
But just to kind of give a little overview, we
engaged with the European Commission extensively

00:25:02.226 --> 00:25:04.976 align:middle
in advance of their consultation
paper last year.

00:25:05.356 --> 00:25:10.246 align:middle
We responded to the consultation, but
we also published a public white paper

00:25:10.476 --> 00:25:14.876 align:middle
on reviving securitization to really
set a marker down on this issue

00:25:15.156 --> 00:25:17.896 align:middle
and start a dialog, start conversations.

00:25:18.156 --> 00:25:22.976 align:middle
We continue to engage with the European
Commission, even last week we sat

00:25:22.976 --> 00:25:29.006 align:middle
down with them, as well as other stakeholders,
the European supervisory authorities,

00:25:29.006 --> 00:25:34.466 align:middle
IOPA and ESMA in particular, EU
member state finance industries,

00:25:34.626 --> 00:25:38.956 align:middle
regulatory bodies across Europe, and
of course the European Parliament.

00:25:38.956 --> 00:25:44.346 align:middle
As I mentioned previously, just last
week we hosted a panel event in Brussels,

00:25:44.506 --> 00:25:50.286 align:middle
with a Spanish MEP called Fernando
Navarrete, who is widely speculated

00:25:50.286 --> 00:25:52.706 align:middle
to play a key role in these discussions.

00:25:53.106 --> 00:25:57.846 align:middle
That was quite a successful event, we had
nearly a hundred participants join us.

00:25:58.386 --> 00:26:04.876 align:middle
But looking forward, as we look beyond the
June publication of the legislative proposals,

00:26:05.066 --> 00:26:10.026 align:middle
we'll start intensifying our advocacy with the
European Parliament and member states even more.

00:26:10.026 --> 00:26:15.126 align:middle
And of course in addition to the direct
advocacy that we do with policy makers,

00:26:15.236 --> 00:26:20.746 align:middle
we've also marshaled a number of our byside
[phonetic] associations to engage on our behalf

00:26:20.746 --> 00:26:22.606 align:middle
and on behalf of the industry as a whole.

00:26:23.056 --> 00:26:28.676 align:middle
So that's a bit of a summary, but I'll
leave it there, Peter, and hand back to you.

00:26:28.776 --> 00:26:31.286 align:middle
&gt;&gt; Smashing, thank you Taggart,
and thank you Kaustub as well.

00:26:31.536 --> 00:26:36.216 align:middle
We've covered quite a lot of ground
in the past, past 30 minutes or so,

00:26:36.216 --> 00:26:38.476 align:middle
so I'd like to give a quick
recap before we sign off.

00:26:38.846 --> 00:26:43.796 align:middle
So we've explained how the U.S.
securitization market is a lot more dynamic,

00:26:43.796 --> 00:26:49.296 align:middle
it's got wider breadth and is more robust
than Europe, and we feel that change does need

00:26:49.296 --> 00:26:52.026 align:middle
to happen within the European
securitization market.

00:26:52.316 --> 00:26:56.116 align:middle
Indeed, we believe that the lack of development

00:26:56.116 --> 00:27:00.726 align:middle
of the European securitization market is perhaps
holding back the European financial system.

00:27:01.046 --> 00:27:04.206 align:middle
May also be hindering European economic growth.

00:27:04.826 --> 00:27:09.946 align:middle
We've also mentioned how we believe change is
needed, and we're lobbying hard for this change.

00:27:10.606 --> 00:27:15.126 align:middle
And if you're interested in this topic, or want
to discuss it further, please reach out to one

00:27:15.126 --> 00:27:18.856 align:middle
of your existing PGIM contacts,
or as Taggart's just mentioned,

00:27:19.176 --> 00:27:21.266 align:middle
we do have a white paper on our website.

00:27:21.696 --> 00:27:22.306 align:middle
Thank you.

00:27:22.616 --> 00:27:22.866 align:middle
Goodbye.

