G20 Summit Puts Great Power Competition in Full ViewG20SummitPutsGreatPowerCompetitioninFullView

Overshadowed by Competing Interests

Aside from the theatrics, the summit’s communique was largely a recycling of previously made commitments under the G20 framework: provide more climate financing, revitalize multilateralism, reform international financial institutions, increase the capacity of Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to maximize their development impact, and address debt vulnerabilities in low and middle-income countries, amongst other initiatives. 

However, under a veto threat from Russia, the communique removed language that appeared in the previous G20 statement that denounced Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. In the latest G20 statement, the Russia-Ukraine conflict was simply referred to as “the war in Ukraine,” which, on the face of it, appears to draw an equivalence between Russia and Ukraine. This framing helps to explain Kyiv’s disappointed reaction to the statement, which “was nothing to be proud of,” according to the Ukrainian foreign minister.  

Ukraine’s key allies within the G20 faced a dilemma: agree to the watered-down language on Ukraine and salvage the summit’s final communique or stand by the previous G20 language and run the risk of perceived failure at a signature event for Prime Minister Modi. Western diplomats likely concluded that the climbdown on Ukraine was preferrable to a failed summit. To be clear, the climbdown—while lacking moral clarity—will have no bearing on the Western military and financial support for Ukraine’s war effort. However, the perception of a failed summit would have validated Russia’s and China’s strategy of undermining yet another Western-backed forum and weakened Modi’s effort to challenge China’s leadership of the global south. 

A few key takeaways are noteworthy and warrant further monitoring as Brazil prepares to take over the G20 presidency in 2024. 

• India, keenly aware of its weight as a strategic actor, continues to cement its status as a regional and global power broker and has shown it is capable of challenging China’s presumed leadership of the global south; 
• The U.S. is slowly, but surely, bringing geopolitical “swing states” into its strategic orbit. Washington’s strategic drive to counter China for influence in the global south was evident in President Biden’s meeting with the leaders of India, Brazil, and South Africa—BRICS countries—on the sidelines of the summit, the announcement of the U.S.-brokered infrastructure deal that connects the Middle East with India, and Biden’s subsequent visit to Vietnam, a frontline country facing China’s regional ambitions; 
• Xi’s absence facilitated U.S. engagements with G20 member states, creating much needed diplomatic space from the distractions that Xi’s presence would have created at the summit; 
• The G20 remains deeply fractured and will continue to face difficulties in reaching consensus given China’s and Russia’s obstructionist approach during G20 deliberations. 

A fractured G20 would suggest that smaller, issue-specific, or like-minded partnerships (i.e., G7, AUKUS, QUAD, etc.) will be more effective in taking decisive actions in the years ahead.