Daleep welcomed Kurt for an in-depth look at the U.S.-China relationship and the Iran war’s implications for Asia-Pacific. Speaking in front of a live audience, they also discussed how geopolitical shifts are reshaping economies, strategic leverage lurking in critical supply chains, and the outlook for Japan.

>> It's a distinct privilege to welcome my dear friend, Dr. Kurt Campbell, and his colleagues to PGIM. Kurt and I became friends at the White House. Our offices were down the hall from each other. I remember Kurt, the first time I briefed Joe Biden in the Oval, you were seated right next to me. You didn't make it go off the rails, so thank you. We sat next to each other going crazy, watching Jayden Daniels throw a hail Mary to beat the Chicago Bears, that was also a good memory. But, you know, I think the world knows you as, and I would say, the most consequential diplomat in recent American history. For those who don't know Kurt's background, he was the 22nd U.S. Deputy -- Secretary of State. He was the author of the Pivot to Asia, during the Obama years. He was the architect of Joe Biden's Asia strategy. He was the driving force of AUKUS, of the QUAD, of the historic thawing between Japan and Korea over the past five years. And, he's also been a Naval officer, a Harvard professor, and a serial entrepreneur. He's now the chairman of The Asia Group. So, Kurt, it's a real pleasure to have you here. Thanks for spending some time with us. You know, I think a lot of -- a lot of world leaders and CEOs probably still give you a call when the world gets complicated. It's complicated right now. Why don't we go right to Iran. The financial markets are consumed with the proximate effects of the war on oil prices. But you and I know the second order effects can be, excuse me, just as consequential. So, I'd love to get your sense of the read-through right now in Beijing. Do they see this war as a -- some people argue -- a demonstration of U.S. military might and a potential way to restore deterrence in the Indo-Pacific? Or, do you see it as a window of opportunity from Beijing's perspective? How do you think they see it?

>> That's a great question, first of all, I just want to, on behalf of my colleagues, it's great to be here at PGIM. We've been looking forward to this. And I will just return the compliment. You can't have a better colleague, a better person to work with to think through hard problems, to be in a foxhole with, than Daleep. So I just am very grateful and it's very rare that people actually say nice things about you in Washington, but I realize we're not in Washington, so it's probably okay up here in New Jersey. So, thank you for that. So, one of the things that's impressive about the work that you guys do is that you're not looking just at first order effects, you're try to look around corners, over the horizon to anticipate, you know, what comes next. And so, you're right to ask how China views the complex develops that take -- that are taking place now in the Gulf. I would just note one thing, now this summit that was for later this month has now been postponed. But just think about this for a minute, until just a couple of days ago, it appeared that the president of the United States, in the middle of a very intense war, was prepared to pick up and go to Beijing. That, in itself, is a remarkable thing.

>> Kurt, can I press you on this? So you prepared a lot of high level summits. Normally when you prepare a president to go into a high level summit, you try to make sure that person is going into it from a position of strength. So do you read Beijing's willingness to have this summit at the original date at the end of March, as a view the President Trump would be coming to Beijing from a position of weakness and therefore, let's have it?

>> To be perfectly honest, I'm not sure that is accurate. I think the Chinese believe that right now their interests lie in trying to stabilize a very complicated relationship, Daleep, and we'll get into this on technology or economics. But I would just say this interesting question about what does the Gulf War mean, this ongoing challenge against Iran, what does it mean for China as they look into the future? It is profoundly mixed, and all complex developments on the international stage have a number of aspects. On the one hand, so there is no country that studies military operations more closely than China. So they made a case study of the initial use of precision weapons in 1991. They've followed closely what's happened in Ukraine, the advent of the use of more mobile capabilities and less expensive UAVs. And they're always thinking about that in terms of what it means for China. So, on the one hand, they look at this military operation, and in truth, much of the Iranian arsenal is similar in some ways to the capabilities that Iran possesses. And so, even though they might look at the longer-term or the strategic implications at an operational level, they're quite impressed by the capacity of the U.S. military. And let's recall, you know, although China's built a remarkable military in the last 50 years, they've actually not used it. The last time China fired shots in anger was in 1978, 1979, border incursions in Vietnam. So they're, you know, trying to, you know, adapt their capabilities to get ready for a potential big military operations. My own argument would be, I don't think they're quite ready yet, and I think they understand the risks, is that the Chinese economy, we focus more on what's going on in the United States, but this has been a very difficult time. They are facing huge structural challenges with youth unemployment, with the property bubble, we can get into this. But a very good point one of my colleagues here, Kelly Magsamen, is with us, points out that we have spent the last 20 years basically seeking to buttress our military capabilities in the Pacific. So we have been, as a great power, really preoccupied in the Middle East for decades. And so I was one of those people, we have other people here that have tried to rebalance away from just over focus on the Middle East. But what we've seen, Daleep, just in the last couple of months. So right now for the first time really in modern history, we have no aircraft carriers in the Pacific. So the one that is there is in dry dock, in Japan. The Marine Fast Reaction Force, that expeditionary force that is there for emergencies has been sent to the Gulf. The weapons systems, defensive capabilities, the Patriots and others in South Korea and Japan have been sent to the Gulf. So all these capabilities, also our overhead capabilities have been repositioned to support our operations against Iran. So we have never had less military deterrent capacity in the Indo-Pacific, basically since the 1950s. And even then, in the advent of the Korean War, we were able to quickly reinforce. And so, the Chinese look at that and that's a moment --

>> That's the window of opportunity to argue.

>> I mean, I think what they see is that, I mean look, this is what you guys think about on a daily basis. My own view is that it is going to be hard for the United States to basically withdraw again, now that we've re-engaged. I think we're going to have enduring issues that we're going to have to deal with in the delivery of oil through the straits, and I think there are going to be sort of emerging security threats from what has taken place. And so while the president might like to basically declare victory and leave, I don't think it's going to be possible. The other side gets a vote, and so just one quick thing, one of the wonderful things about sitting down, like for instance doing diplomacy with Chinese friends or [inaudible], they have this rich lexicon of these wonderful Chinese sayings --

>> Proverbs.

>> -- about proverbs killing the monkey to scare the chicken. Or it's the reverse of that. And crossing the river to feel the stones. We, my feeling, since we as Americans at least can call on movies, movie moments to make our points.

>> Top Gun.

>> Well, I've used Top Gun a couple times. My favorite though, you can find everything of import in The Godfather. And usually in Godfather I, Godfather III was a terrible movie --

>> You're making a mafia reference?

>> I am, but basically there, you know, when the Godfather says, I want to leave and they keep pulling me back in. That's the Middle East.

>> Middle East.

>> And that is what is happening now.

>> But given that reality, Kurt, there is speculation that in the summit, whenever it takes place, let's say it's late April, Taiwan will be on the agenda, frontally, and the president, President Trump, may be forced with a decision as to whether to shift, almost in an official sense, from a policy of strategic ambiguity to something more akin to strategic accommodation. Do you buy that speculation?

>> I do. And I don't -- I think it is more than speculation. I think from interactions that we've had with senior folks around the president, he believes that there is some sort of middle way and that he wants to navigate to an outcome where there is less tension between China and Taiwan. We just -- just quickly, Daleep, we just had the first meeting with Secretary Bessent and Ambassador Greer in Paris, to get ready for this summit. Now the truth is, they were surprised when the president decided that he wanted to postpone. They were busy engaging on a meeting in ten days. Now we have a little bit more time. But what the summit is shaping up to, the president has his asks, the Chinese have theirs. What the president wants, short-term substantial agricultural purposes -- purchases -- if you lay a map down on the United States, those congressional districts that are most at risk on the Republican side come from agricultural districts that basically produce issues from soybeans, sorghum, rice, wheat, corn, almonds, walnuts. The things that the Chinese have in the past bought from us in large quantities. They have not recently. President wants a big purchase of those things to basically buttress his political stakes in the fall. He'd like the Chinese to buy a lot of Boeing jets, would like to be the savior of Boeing, 737 stretch that has had so much trouble with its re-accreditation after the challenge it's had. To my surprise, one of the things that Bessent, Daleep, spent his time on in Paris is trying to develop an investment protocol where China could invest in a variety of things in the United States, including potentially electric vehicles and other technology pursuits, and he would like a commitment on the part of China to stop any provision of components of fentanyl. I commend him on that, that's -- Daleep and I worked on that have for years. Those are the things that the president wants --

>> So --

>> -- short-term.

>> You're sketching out an extended truce based on renewed Chinese commitments to purchase soybeans and Boeing aircraft. And then a bargain of sorts, you mentioned Chinese access to make investments in the U.S. homeland, presumably in areas that don't have a nexus with national security --

>> Yeah, but --

>> Will China reduce its [inaudible], because the markets are going to focus very much on, will anything change in the Chinese business model, in terms of its excess production capacity? Is that the quid pro quo for allowing access?

>> So, I think actually there's a different set of asks that the Chinese are going to put on the table. I think they're going to say, hey look, if you want us to buy all this stuff, you've got to lower our tariffs. So I think there's a real possibility that at the end of the summit, that the tariffs on China might be less, even than on our closest allies. That's number one what they want. Number two, they -- look, they do not want to become addicted to our technology stack, but they want some access to some of our capabilities. One of the incredible things that Daleep and company worked on was how to think about what are our leading edge technologies in AI, and semiconductor manufacturing, using lithography, blue light capabilities, those are things that really provide us the high ground in some of these areas. Now, I think we would argue, I haven't really talked to Daleep about it recently, that having some restrictions is in our national interest. I think the Trump team has decided that providing some of those capabilities might be in our best interest. I'd like to debate that with them, but the Chinese will argue that that's what they want.

>> Where do you come out on that, Kurt, because I --

>> I come out on restricting.

>> Okay. So the H -- I think the H200 license was approved --

>> So let me just go through quickly what the Chinese want in return, and then we'll go to that. So they want tariffs lowered, they want access to technology, they want unhindered ability to invest in certain areas in the United States. I think the argument, Daleep, that you are describing, there are some in the technology world, and clearly the key advisors around the president, have made this argument. They said look, if we continue to provide China with cutting edge capabilities, they won't be able to diversify to their own supplies, number one, and number two, because we have cut these deals with some of the technology firms, when they make a sale, we get a commission on that, which, in itself is unusual. And I think that argument has basically prevailed. And it is based, I think, on a misunderstanding. If you look, very few leaders have been as transparent about goals and ambitions as President Xi, and on coming to power gave a series of speeches. Daleep was one of the people that was -- that were first to really identify this, that the cutting edge, the area of high ground, of competition with the West, was going to be technology. And China, in every area, quantum, robotics, AI, biology, wanted to command that high ground with the United States. No -- not ambiguous whatsoever. And so they're not going to be in a situation where they allow China to be overly reliant on those capabilities, he's going to seek self-sufficiency, so he may take these in the short-term, use them to basically bolster up capabilities, but I fully expect China is going to continue, Daleep, in a relentless competition with us for the technology high ground.

>> Yeah, that's why I struggle to understand the concept of lock-in. I think it's a fantasy, because there are directives after directives which indicate the requirement for State of Enterprise is to purge all U.S. silicon by 2027.

>> Yeah. So I think, Daleep, that's exactly right. So I think they might accept in the short-term, one of the things that we're seeing in leading Chinese firms is that they actually have shortages of certain high-end chips of the kind that NVIDIA and other American semiconductor companies produce. And they want very much to fill that gap for a period, while Chinese capacity comes online. And so, I do not believe that this is an opportunity for us to lock-in. But I think the president is convinced of that. I will also say, what's interesting, and Daleep points this out as well, I like -- it's unusual how much the president frankly looks forward to engagements with Putin and Xi, and his hopes to re-engage with Kim Jong Un. He clearly is intrigued, I'll just say that, with the role that these leaders play on the global stage. And I think he wants to be respected and engaged by President Xi.

>> We'll mow down the small yard with a high fence, and we'll have something more akin to a toll drawbridge. You know, the 25% cut the U.S. will be getting from NVIDIA. Something along those lines. My question is, where does that leave the global AI race? I mean, people observe that China has more data, has more engineers, has more energy, has more land, [inaudible] computing power. Now it's going to have, let's just say a second or third generation chip in its stack, what's your assessment of where this shakes out? Do you think China will soon be training and running frontier AI models in a way that's close to parody with the U.S.?

>> I personally do. We've got our AI guru from The Asia Group with us is here, he will have some opportunities over lunch to explore a little of this. I believe that is the case. I also would say, you can't look at this act in isolation, it is also the case, in addition to basically flirting with the provision of our best capabilities with China, we've also politically gone to war, legally, with probably the most impressive U.S. company in this arena with Anthropic. And so, and you know, there is some, I think, sense of confidence among some of the AI leaders, that yeah, Anthropic will be able to stand up to some of this. But trust me, when you're in a company and you're under siege from the federal government, it makes it very hard to basically focus on your business at the same time that you're trying to defend in these sort of relentless court proceedings. And so, I think the combination of these things is likely to be very challenging. And you know, the recent AI summit in India did underscore the strength of some of the American positioning, and I think if we played our hand well, that this would be an arena where an enduring set of American advantages can prevail, and also it is clear that for countries that have AI ambitions, India, in the Gulf, countries in Asia, we are the partner of choice. But I don't know how long that will last.

>> Kurt, before we turn to other countries in the region, I want to get to Japan and India, especially. One more on China, you've written a lot about China's production scale. You know, China in one-third of global manufacturing in value-added terms, and if you look at any strategic sector they prioritizes ships, cars, drones, batteries, machinery, pharmaceuticals, the market share continues to grow.

>> Yeah.

>> You've proposed the concept of allied scale, in a sense, to level the playing field in terms of the capacity to produce goods that are strategic for economic and national security. Do you think that concept is getting traction, or is it -- is it more academic at this stage?

>> Well, look, it's a very good question. And this is something I've written a little bit about with a colleague that Daleep and I both worked with, a wonderful up and coming signologist named Rush Doshi. And so the idea here, just quickly, is that if you look at the challenges that we have met in the past, during the Second World War, in the Cold War, the Korean War, almost all of those challenges the United States had the industrial technological capacity to basically out maneuver and surpass any challenge that we faced. This is the first time in our history that we cannot do that alone. Now it's hard to face that directly, but that is in fact the case, and so, the argument goes that we will need to work much more deeply and constructively with allies and partners on technology, on military issues, on diplomacy, kind of the work that Daleep and I and others did, during the last administration. But the truth is, even those partnerships were profoundly insufficient. We need to go much beyond that, much deeper engagements and partnerships. Not these paternal relationships where the United States is the dominant player, truly working together on coproduction, co-development. I believe that this is a concept that is increasingly getting buy-in on both sides of the party, and I even think that there are people in the Trump Administration that also believe it. You see it playing out in critical minerals, but their path to, you know, a partnership I think is going to be hard. I think some countries that are trying desperately to position to work with us, but more are likely to feel wary about that engagement. So as we speak, just quickly, and I know you're going to transition to this --

>> Well no, I want to actually -- let's talk about India. Because talk about a country that's wary of paternalistic relationships, India comes to mind right away.

>> To the surprise of many of the Indian strategists, U.S.-India relationship, I think right now is bereft of trust and confidence. We're putting a good face of, you know, certain areas that we continue to work together, that the fundamental ambition of the relationship I think has been either lost or put on hold. I would be of the view that the most important relationship for the United States to get right in the 21st century, is actually the U.S.-India relationship. I think it's the most consequential and I would be all in on that relationship. So I'm in the tank on India, I think it's incredibly important, and I think there are a lot of areas to find common purpose --

>> Tech defense intel would be among your top five?

>> Yeah, but I would put more, I think the diaspora relationship, the educational potential. I'll just give you just one aside, Daleep and I worked on just a small initiative which was the educational scholarships that came as part of the QUAD. So there's four countries in the QUAD; Japan, the United States, Australia, and India, so we created a program with the support of many in the business community, including PGIM, to create scholarships for two years of STEM work in the United States universities. So, you know, we started a competition, we worked with universities, so that they would create slots for these students. And we had, we did a competition, so we'd take 25 candidates from each nation. We had about 150 candidates from Japan, that was good, you know, small, you know, about 160 from Korea -- excuse me, from Australia, about 250 from the United States, 6,000 from India. That gives you a sense of the potential, the hunger to engage with us. And so I -- I was very excited about that. And I still think it might be possible, but I think there has been -- I think this last year is regrettable.

>> Yeah, agreed. Let me hit you on one more, and then open it up to the group for questions. The relatively new Japanese prime minister is --

>> She's now engaging on this investment deal.

>> And, and of course, the question we put to her about whether there will be Naval escorts from Japan through the Strait of Hormuz, but leaving that aside for a moment, I mean she -- her policy mix, it's reminiscent of the late Prime Minister Abe, she's been compared to Margaret Thatcher, looser fiscal policy. But she seems to be discouraging the Bank of Japan from tightening monetary policy. As a consequence, Japanese government bond yields in the long end of the curve have risen substantially, and the yen has weakened. But can you kind of look at this policy mix, not through the economic or market lens, but what is the kind of big picture vision strategically? I mean it seems to be centered around a resurgent defense posture, industrial policy, but also trying to address some of the affordability problems in Japan. But how does it hang together?

>> What thought -- what we thought to be sort of a basic meeting tomorrow kind of re-affirmation in the alliance, in which she was going to try to explain to President Trump, and how he talked about [inaudible] and partner, and basically win him over. If you look at the polling in Japan as of yesterday, the two polls that have been concluded, one by a Asahi, the other by another leading media market, 8 or 9% of Japanese people support this war.

>> Wow.

>> So that is not insignificant, and so I -- we'll see how this plays out. Today my guess is, this is one of the most consequential meetings between Japan and the United States in decades. So we have -- they still have to work out the tariff picture. We haven't figured out how we're going to do this $550 billion investment protocol. The 301 that Japan was surprisingly named in, that came out last week, and the fact that most of our capacities, as we've discussed, have vacated the -- the issue that is going to be front and center is, will Japan help us? And I think her initial instinct is to offer some, you know, like we'll study and we'll look, and maybe we can help with diplomacy with the Iranians. I don't think the president -- I don't think he wants to hear that. I think he wants to hear, are you with us or not? And you know, my guess is she's going to try to find a way to say yes.

>> -- me see if colleagues have questions. Kathy?

>> I wonder to what extent is China either subtly, or more [inaudible], reaching out to the rest of the world. Talked a little bit about India. In [inaudible] saying, since you used The Godfather reference, I'll use a Seinfeld reference, saying, I'm there for you, right? To other sort of global [inaudible] countries and saying, okay, you might have some reticence about the U.S., given the changing dynamics of the its role in the world, but like hey, I've given capital before, I'm there for you, and what is -- how might that really change what the new [inaudible]?

>> Yeah, so Kathy, and the question -- folks that are listening at home, is you know, how has China responded, are they trying to appeal to both leading countries in Asia and Europe and the global south during this -- this momentous time? So I would say that some of the recent polling in various leading capitals should worry us. In Canada, in much of Europe, and even in South Korea, you see polling that suggests that there's more confidence right now in China than there is in the United States. That should be seen as a canary in the coal mine, and even though in places like Africa, in which the dream of Chinese investment has not turned out to be such an incredible reality. They bring their own workers, there isn't enough sort of capacity that's created with some of these investments. But at the same time, I do believe that there is so much anxiety on the global stage, that China does have opportunities. And so what you describe is actually happening. I would say, the lure and desire for continued relationship with the United States is strong in most of these countries. And they all are worried and wary about the terms that are changing. But at the same time, I also think they probably have some concerns about China. And those concerns are not just strategic. They have a lot to do with what Daleep describes. What China has done with over capacity is worrying to me. After China entered the WTO, for most of the overcapacity in the last 20 years. It had a huge impact on how we felt about trade and global commerce. But now that U.S. markets, at least for this period, are largely closed to certain Chinese capabilities like autos, I think what we're seeing in Europe is the beginning of much more public concerns about China. The role that it is playing in terms of hurting the effectiveness of like, for instance, leading German auto firms. They're under enormous pressure now, because of less expensive, you know, electric battery vehicles. And so I -- I'm not sure it's going to be as easy to pick off countries, and a country like India, who I think is always going to be strategically wary of China, the truth is, the partnership for the United States with these countries is there for the taking.

>> Aayush, please.

>> Aayush, from emerging markets.

>> Hi, Aayush. How are you?

>> So Saudi Arabia has this pipeline where, you know, they can evacuate oil to the Red Sea, right? Is there a risk from the Houthis to sort of bad oil, you know, flowing from the Red Sea, which would exacerbate the whole supply situation?

>> Yes. And you know what's happening now in global markets. They're looking at every potential, either using different vehicles for getting crude out for the Middle East, over land, capacities. Figuring out, you know, what can be done with strategic, you know, petroleum reserves, allowing Russian oil to be purchased on -- in global markets, even encouraging Iranian oil to be purchased. They're doing everything possible, but in the end, if the straits remain closed or substantially, you know, constipated, it will be very difficult to keep up with global demand and, you know, you guys are debating, we've heard lots of different concerns, if this continues for the next couple of months where oil will be, I think -- I've heard lots of pessimistic stuff, and I think that will likely come to fruition, despite the best efforts of leaders among the western democracies. I would just say one thing, guys, we're -- you know, we were talking earlier about what -- what we learned from previous conflicts. The way to think about what might be happening now and lying ahead in the Persian Gulf, is very much akin to what happened in the Red Sea over the course of the last year or two. The Houthis were able to innovate technologies, UAVs, and basically hold at risk western shipping through the Red Sea very effectively, and tax U.S. --

>> At very low cost.

>> -- you know, assets. And so much so that much of that commerce was redirected around the Cape of Good Hope, even though it was more expensive. And it suggests what's possible here for a determined Iran, that still has substantial UAV capacities and the like that are spread out across the, you know, both the lips and the mouth of the straits, but also further north. I -- so Daleep, I think the likelihood here is that the Iranians have indicated that they're not particularly interested right at this moment, at negotiating. I think they want to create more leverage. I think they're interested at holding us at risk with respect to oil, and drive up -- And that would likely last, I think for months. And let's say that the president is successful, he's been briefed on what it would take to create the capacity, to try to secure, and first of all, it's unclear we can do this without boots on the ground somewhere. Remember, the experience that we have of when the flow has been threatened, particularly during the Iran-Iraq War that preceded the first war with Iraq, between the United States in 1991, the 1980s Iraq-Iran conflict, two tankers were attacked and they created difficulties, they had to be cleared, unbelievably disruptive, just those things. And so, remember, the ships that have been attacked to date are relatively small, you know, ships that are seeking to basically run the Strait. And a couple of them have been attacked. We have not yet seen a super tanker, of which there are about 200 trying to get out, make a decision to try to run. No insurance company is giving that backing, and there's a lot of trepidation about trying to do that. And so there are not only huge number of ships waiting to leave, there are a lot that are waiting to come in. This is -- this will not be unwound in a short [inaudible]

>> Time for one more. Yes, please.

>> Hi Kurt, thanks for being here with us today. My name is Sanjay, I'm a junior analyst within credit research.

[ Inaudible ]

You previously briefly mentioned that the United States has been collaborating a little bit more with foreign nations in terms of securing critical minerals, but the reality is a lot of these resources are finite and generally scarce. China has been a lot more aggressive in terms of securing supply on domestic production capacity and also taking [inaudible] in overseas products of the United States. Of course, under President Trump it's [inaudible] through tariffs to help our domestic producers, but my question to you is, do you feel like we are acting with enough urgency in terms of very [inaudible] in terms of buy, and how much does us engaging in conflict in the Middle East really [inaudible] us?

>> So it's an excellent question, it's really about like how are we doing on self-reliance or working with allies and partners on rare earths? And have we done enough? Is there enough urgency here? And I would say the answer to that question is both this administration and the previous administration tried to make rare earths an area of enormous focus. And we signed agreements with our allies and partners, we've highlighted crash courses in certain kinds of mining and the like, but I think what you point out is undeniable. First of all, the areas advantage that China has have been built up over decades. And of, like if you created a sort of a hierarchy of critical minerals that you need, of the top 40, China enjoys overwhelming advantages in 38 of them. And those will be enduring. And the problem is not just that they are a finite supply, that is an issue, without question, but the real issue is processing. We could have done some of these, and we have a couple of processing plants in the United States, very few states are comfortable with the environmental issues. And so we're looking at other countries to sort of pick up the slack, in Australia and elsewhere. The challenge is that these are not easily remedied in the short-term. They take years, and so when we hear senior administration officials suggesting that these critical areas in which we are clearly at a disadvantage, will be eased in a year, I don't buy it. I think it's going to take over a decade. And in truth, when we do a blunderbuss set of declarations around tariffs, that the president has waged against China, and they come back with a very clear scalpel of like if you do that, then we're going to do rare earths, or rare earth magnets, and it turns out that we can't do anything from an F35 fighter to a refrigerator without access to those capabilities, it is an immediate recognition of vulnerability. If I could just say one of the -- I think for you guys to think about, the most interesting sort of feature of the U.S.-China relationship is of an uncomfortable interdependence. Both countries are seeking desperately to find sovereign or independent means to basically be self-sufficient. As much as China would like to basically rest free of their over reliance on the dollar, it's going to be very difficult. And so the interdependence is the key feature of the U.S.-China relationship. And both countries are desperately trying to distance, but at the same time are coming face to face with enduring elements of intimacy and interdependence that are just undeniable, and are hard to shake over time. And so, the real question that we're going to have to grapple with is how do leaders deal with enduring interdependence at the time that they're seeking to establish self-sufficiency? And so in some respects, the acknowledgement of the importance of why a meeting between the United States and China has to take place, is a recognition of that interdependence, and that even though there's going to be difficulty and competition, finding a way to ensure that certain avenues of communication and, you know, connection continue, despite how uncomfortable it is, is a reality of 21st century life.

>> Kurt, just on behalf of all of us, I just want to say thanks for your wisdom today, your decades of public service, and also your service towards global peace and prosperity. Thank you.

>> Thank you.

[ Applause ]